In the last two and a half weeks, Iran has experienced a series of mysterious explosions in a way that reduces any chance of coincidences. The blog “Intel Times” has analyzed the events already at the stage of their occurrence and is now trying to summarize with new details.
It began on June 25 with the burning of a transformer and a power outage in most parts of the city of Shiraz and a mysterious explosion at the “Air Industries Organization – Hujir” base that hosts the “Shahid Hamat Industries” group, which manufactures surface-to-surface missiles and the “Shahid Baikri” group, which produces fuel To missile engines and continued in parallel.
A deadly gas explosion was also reported on June 30 at a clinic in the heart of Tehran, but in at least one case, on July 2, at the Natanz nuclear facility, there was no doubt, the enormous damage recorded from space in a centrifuge center and a “take responsibility” statement sent by an anonymous group Homeland Security has made it clear that this is what marks the beginning or culmination of a new campaign to defeat the Iranian nuclear project, a chapter that seems to focus on infrastructure that Iran cannot bury underground but is important for further development of Iran’s nuclear and missile program.
If that was not enough, the explosions in Iran began to accompany, with a successful timing for it, an Israeli spy series on channel 11, called “Tehran”, which managed to paint in bright imaginative colors the reports of various explosions in Iran. It started mainly following a report of an explosion at a power station in Shiraz and later at other strategic sites in Tehran and was immediately linked to a series describing an institution agent sent on a secret mission in Tehran to break through the cyber dimension to Tehran Central Power Station to paralyze defense systems. Of Iran. In the future, it is also assisted by opposition elements and is working to enable the staff of Mossad fighters to infiltrate the security system of a missile site in order to sabotage its facilities.
Senior intelligence official in the Middle East:
The US media recently relied on a man identified as a “senior intelligence official in the Middle East.” About a year to two years in Iran’s nuclear program, in addition, the source denied any connection to the explosions that took place, in those days, in the Tehran area.
When talking about an intelligence source in the Middle East who briefs reporters in the Iranian context, three options come up in descending order: the Israeli “Mossad”, American intelligence and, in all likelihood, a “secret partner” of an Arab-friendly intelligence service.
Such an action, if relied on the burial and blasting of an “explosive device”, would have required feet on the ground and in such a situation, it is unlikely that the perpetrator would have sent a two-hour notice to the BBC in Persian unless he knew the explosion was already remotely controlled.
A precedent for a briefing on Israel’s covert operation in Iran we saw following the Mossad’s operation to bring the “nuclear archive” from Tehran. The briefing was conducted by Prime Minister Netanyahu three months after the execution and at the cost of harsh criticism from senior members of the Israeli intelligence community. Later, foreign reporters were also personally briefed.
Now we are left with the question, what exactly was the purpose of that intelligence source’s vote on Israel and how does it align with the responsibility statement it sent, near the time of the explosion, an Iranian group called the Homeland Cheetah, to a BBC correspondent in the language The Persian? Apparently there is a contradiction here between the “operating factor”‘s desire to distance itself from the explosion, through what appears to be a use of “fiction” and on the other hand a quote that marks the “operating factor” from someone who must have been a “secret partner”.
Usually Israel’s “secret partners” in the “special operations” in Iran are the Americans. A senior Israeli official said that the US intelligence community and the White House recognized the operation to obtain the “Iranian Nuclear Archive” and that Israel had updated the United States immediately after it was completed successfully. American?
According to the publications, the center of the explosion was inside the center of the centrifuges, but recent satellite images identified the center of the explosion next to a backup unit at the entrance, which raises the possibility that it is a unit.
Another headline is that the Natanz blast will delay the nuclear program by up to two years, a claim that is only partially true since Iran’s uranium enrichment capability is already a fact, the only delay in the assumption and the Iranians did not build a similar center in Purdue Within a few months, whether in secret or following a breach of the nuclear agreement.
In order for an explosion at an enrichment facility to lead to a one to two year delay in the nuclear program, what we saw in Natanz is just part of a broader sabotage campaign that focuses on a range of facilities, part of a “supply chain” of above-ground facilities that can be damaged and by non-aerial attack.
What is a supply chain?
A supply chain or “logistics network” is a coordinated system established by the Iranians and is based on organizations, people, activities, information and resources involved in providing a product or service essential to the nuclear project. In the case of the facility at Natanz, it is a matter of purchasing essential materials and support infrastructure such as: precise measuring instruments, centrifuge motors and various raw materials for the production and assembly of centrifuges.
The Centanz Centrifuge Center supports the thousands of old-generation centrifuges, which are deployed in the underground part of the facility but also in the thousand and a few advanced centrifuges installed in the Purdue underground facility.
It is estimated that in the explosion, Iran lost the ability to support and serially develop advanced 6th and 9th generation centrifuges and probably also about 30 advanced centrifuges that were found during the launch phase and were supposed to move to one of the nuclear sites and allow the Iranians to double uranium enrichment.
Uranium-238 is a nuclear material that undergoes an enrichment process that eventually accumulates enough nuclear fission material to produce a nuclear chain reaction. This process requires the operation of thousands of centrifuges.
In order to produce thousands of centrifuges (centrifuges) it is necessary to import or locally produce the main raw material which is aluminum. The aluminum passes to metal plants or machining until it arrives in a cylindrical configuration at the center of the centrifuges at Natanz. The center requires more electronic components and all of these are protected in the list of sanctions on Iran under the definition of “dual products”, products that could be used for the development of weapons of mass destruction.
A large part of the products banned from purchase by Iran were secretly purchased in e-commerce arenas such as Chinese Ali Baba, by straw companies, which are actually staffed by Iranian Ministry of Defense and logistics staff. The supply of defense industrial organizations in Iran. The United States is working to disrupt this capability by imposing sanctions on companies identified with the nuclear and missile project and sometimes by other means such as “sting” operations.
Operation Sting, from what we learned from US intelligence, is an operation that identifies a demand originating in the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s procurement directorate and executes an operation with a very specific purpose: to entice the procurator to reach a base state, incriminate and arrest him or, alternatively, make a deal to sell to the Iranian procurement director. Equipment (measuring instruments, motors and electrical units) is “contaminated” with locating or sabotage components so that its trajectory can be tracked until it is assimilated into pre-marked infrastructure and the operation of the cargo it carries with it through “access operation” in cyber or other remote control.
One of the scenarios that followed the explosion at the Centanz Centrifuge Center was a complex operation that lasted several months and was intended to inject into the specific center, directly (agent) or indirectly (sting), a trapped charge, near or as part of the center’s electrical backup unit. To a chain of actions that ends in a destructive explosion.
In some arenas, residents also reported power outages. One of those arenas that did not get attention was in the city of Shiraz, in an explosion at a transformer station that also supplies power to Iran’s electronics industry organization, which develops precision components and measuring devices for the nuclear industry as well as missile navigation systems. Iran reported that the blast was caused by a drastic change in the load exerted on the station’s transformers. The power plant is usually controlled by a control system that is supposed to regulate the supplies in such a way that the system does not collapse and in the case of transformers, that they do not explode.
Aluminum for centrifuge production:
One of the most important materials for the production of centrifuges is aluminum. Leading the procurement effort for the Natanz Center is Muhammad Fakhri-Zada, who has been identified in US sanctions as leading a group called TESA and using subsidiaries to import raw materials from China and use manufacturing and cutting plants across Tehran and Iran for machining the centrifuges.
Aluminum 6061-T6 is required by Iran for the production of centrifuge parts, but also for missiles and components in the production lines of the automotive industries and this leads us to two more explosions that occurred in the last week.
On July 7, a wooden explosion takes place in a facility called “Spahan Bratz” belonging to the Iranian car concern “SAIPA”. The concern is subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards and has recently engaged in cooperation with the Iranian Ministry of Defense.
This is an industrial area located a few kilometers from two secret warehouses used by the Iranian Ministry of Defense, one, a hangar for hiding “nuclear archive” safes and another warehouse where containers with nuclear materials from the secret nuclear program were unloaded.
Yesterday, there was an explosion in a new aluminum production plant “SALCO” that Iran launched only about two months ago and now allows it to overcome the sanctions that apply to the import of aluminum from China through self-production. The factory was built by China and launched by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani himself. It is not inconceivable that the aluminum produced in the factory should also provide the raw materials with which the Iranians produce centrifuges and missile parts.